Web-fraud is one of the most unpleasant features of today's Internet. Two eminent examples of web-fraudulent activities are phishing and typosquatting. Phishing aims to elicit sensitive information from users by presenting them with mock-ups of legitimate web sites. Typosquatting is the nefarious practice of fielding web sites with names closely resembling those of legitimate and popular Internet destinations. Effects range from relatively benign (such as unwanted or unexpected ads) to downright sinister (especially, when typosquatting is combined with phishing).
Introduction
The Internet and its main application -the Web -have been growing continuously and uncontrollably in recent years. Just in the last two years the Web content has doubled in size from 10 billion to over 20 billion pages, according to latest results from Google and Yahoo [17] . Unfortunately, this tremendous growth has been accompanied by a commensurate increase in nefarious activity. The web represents a very appealing platform for various types of electronic fraud, of which phishing and typosquatting are two examples. Phishing is the well-known activity aimed at eliciting sensitive information -e.g., usernames, passwords and credit card details -from unsuspecting users. It typically starts with a user being directed to a fake web site with the look-and-feel of a legitimate, familiar and/or well-known web site. Consequences of phishing can range from denial-of-service to full-blown identity theft, followed by real financial losses. Only in 2007, more than 3 Billion U.S. dollars were lost to such attacks [5] . Typosquatting is the practice of registering domain names that are typographical errors (or minor spelling variations) of well-known web site addresses (target domains) [45] . Incidentally, typosquatting is illegal in some countries, such as the United States. (See the Anti-Cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act [3] ). Typosquatting can be detrimental to both domain owners and regular users. It is often related to domain parking services and advertisement syndication, i.e. instructing browsers to fetch advertisements from a server and blending them with content of the web site that the user intends to visit [45] . In addition to displaying unexpected pages, typo-domains often display malicious, offensive and unwanted content, such as ads and pop-ups. Moreover, some even install malware [6, 44] and certain typo-domains of children-oriented web sites redirect users to adult content [12] . Worse yet, typo-domains of financial web sites can serve as natural platforms for passive phishing attacks 1 . For example, in a recent incident [15] , customers of the Orange County Teachers Federal Credit Union (OCTFCU) (octfcu.com) were targeted by a phishing campaign using the typo-domain octfu.com. 2 Recent studies have assessed the popularity of both types of malicious activities [42, 19] . For example, in Fall 2008, McAfee Alert Labs found more than 80, 000 domains typosquatting on just the top 2, 000 web sites [24] . Also, according to the Anti-Phishing Working Group (APWG), the number of reported phishing attacks between April 2006 and April 2007 exceeded 300, 000 [2] . However, the problem remains far from solved and continuous to be a race between the web-fraudsters and the security community.
Our goal is to counter web-fraud by detecting domains hosting such activities. Our approach is inspired by several recent discussions and articles within the security community. Security researchers and practitioners increasingly advocate transition to HTTPS for all web transactions, similar to that from Telnet to SSH. Eminent examples of such discussions can be found in [7] and [46] . This leads us to the following questions:
1. Can HTTPS detect and mitigate web-fraud activities, such as phishing and typosquatting? 2. Will HTTPS be enforced on most (or the most popular) web sites in the near future?
3. If HTTPS becomes truly widespread, will web-fraudsters adapt and also use it?
4. How different are SSL certificates used by today's web-fraudsters from those used by legitimate domains?
5. Are there effective web-fraud detection and mitigation techniques that do not entail sacrificing user privacy, as a side effect of using HTTPS?
Contributions. This paper makes several contributions, by answering the above questions: First, we present a novel technique to detect web-fraud domains using HTTPS. It relies on a classifier that analyzes certificates of such domains. We validate the classifier by training and testing it over data collected from the Internet. The classifier achieves a detection accuracy over 80% and, in some cases, as high as 95%, with few false positives. Our classifier is orthogonal to existing mitigation techniques and can be integrated with other methods that do not rely on HTTPS. Second, to justify using HTTPS, we measure the overall prevalence of HTTPS in popular and randomly sampled Internet domains. We then consider the popularity of HTTPS in the context of web-fraud by studying its use in phishing and typosquatting activities. We then analyze, for the first time, all fields of SSL certificates. Our analysis shows that some fields have significantly different distributions in certificates of malicious domains, compared to those of legitimate and popular domains. We identify useful features and patterns that represent possible symptoms of web-fraud; they guide the design of our detection technique. Finally, our findings serve as an additional motivation for mandating the use of HTTPS, not only to guarantee confidentiality and authenticity, but also to combat web-fraud.
Organization. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces a brief overview of X.509 certificates. Section 3 presents the rationale and details of our measurements and analysis. In Section 4, we describe the details of a classifier that detects malicious domains, based on information obtained from SSL certificates. Section 5 discusses the implications of our findings and the limitations of our study. Section 6 contains an overview of related work. Finally, we conclude our paper in Section 7.
2 Overview of X.509 Certificate Format X.509 is an ITU-T standard for public key infrastructures (PKI). X.509 specifies, among other things, standard formats for public key certificates, revocation lists, attribute certificates, and a certification path validation algorithm. It assumes a strict hierarchical system of certification authorities (CAs). In fact, the term X.509 certificate usually refers to an IETF's PKIX Certificate and CRL Profile of the X.509 v3 certificate standard, as specified in RFC 5280 [8] . In this paper we are concerned with the public key certificate portion of X.509. In the rest of the paper, we refer to the public key certificate format of X.509 as a certificate, or an SSL/HTTPS certificate. According to X.509, a CA issues a certificate binding a public key to an X.500 Distinguished Name (or to an Alternative Name, e.g., an e-mail address or a DNS-entry). Web-browserssuch as Internet Explorer, Mozilla/Firefox, Chrome and Safari -come with pre-installed trusted root certificates. Browser software makers determine which CAs are trusted third parties for the browsers' users. The root certificates can be manually removed or disabled, however, users rarely do so.
The general structure of an X.509 v3 [8] certificate is shown in Figure 1 . As discussed later in Section 3, we analyze all fields for certificates of both legitimate and malicious domains. Each certificate contains:
• X.509 version number; the current version is 3.
• Serial number assigned by the issuing CA.
• Parameters specific to the signature algorithm used
• Issuer name (e.g., root CA) • Validity period (start and end dates).
• Subject name -the name of the entity to which the certificate is issued.
• Other fields contain parameters specific to the public key of the subject, followed by some subject-specific identifiers and optional extensions.
• Signature (over all certificate fields) by the issuer.
Measurements and Analysis of SSL Certificates
We first describe our data sets and the means of their collection. We then present our analysis and show how these results guide the design of a classifier that detects web-fraud domains.
Data Sets
Our measurement data was collected mainly during August 2009. It includes three types of domain sets: Legitimate, Phishing and Typosquatting sets. Each domain is probed twice. We probe each domain for web existence (by sending an HTTP request) and for HTTPS existence (by sending an HTTPS request). If a domain responds to HTTPS, we harvest its SSL certificate. Below, we describe the obtained data sets and the state of HTTP/HTTPS utilization among them, also summarized in Table 1 .
Legitimate and Popular Domain Data Sets
The following data sets are considered for measurements and analysis of popular and legitimate domains:
• Alexa: 100, 000 most popular domains according to Alexa [1] • .com: 100, 000 random samples of .com domain zone file, collected from VeriSign [32] .
• .net: 100, 000 random samples of .net domain zone file, collected from VeriSign [32] .
Alexa [1] is a subsidiary of Amazon.com known for its web-browser toolbar and for its web site that reports traffic ranking of Internet web sites. Once installed, the toolbar collects data on the browsing behavior of users. This data is transmitted to Alexa where it is stored and analyzed (along with other metrics). It forms the basis for web traffic reporting. The company does not provide information on the number of users using its toolbar, but it claims several millions [18] . We use Alexa ranking as our measure of popularity of legitimate domains. We also randomly sample .com and .net to ensure an unbiased data-set.
In the rest of the paper, we use Alexa, .com, and .net to denote three respective data sets containing the domains or certificates harvested as described above. We found that 34% of Alexa domains use HTTPS; 26% in .com and 16% in .net. The fact that 34% of Alexa domains respond to HTTPS indicates a healthy degree of HTTPS usage among popular Internet domains. Our Table 1 . The observed 34%-percent HTTPS utilization represents an increase of about 3% over the Alexa set probed 6 months earlier. We expect this percentage to continue increase in the near future. 3 For convenience, when we refer to Alexaset, we mean the set of Alexa's domains that have SSL certificates (same for .com and .net ).
Phishing Data Set
We collected 2, 811 domains considered to be hosting phishing scams. They were obtained from the PhishTank web site [11] . We note that reported URLs in PhishTank are verified by several users and, as a result, are malicious with high probability. We consider this data set as a baseline for phishing domains. In the rest of the paper we use phishing to denote the data set containing domains or related certificates of phishing web sites harvested from PhishTank. We found that a significant percentage -30% -of phishing web sites employ HTTPS. This represents a 5% increase over earlier measurements conducted in October 2008. We attribute this trend in part to the tendency of phishers to adapt to the users' heightened awareness of the importance of secure transactions. Furthermore, we discovered a number of HTTPS domains (∼10%) for which we cannot obtain corresponding certificates, due to various SSL errors (e.g., illegal certificate size). For convenience, when we refer to phishing set, we mean the set of phishing domains that have SSL certificates.
Typosquatting Data Set
To collect SSL certificates of typosquatting domains, we first needed a set of names of typosquatting domains. Our approach was to start from a small seed sample of Internet domains and find typosquatters from this sample. We used our .com and .net data sets (described earlier) as a seed, since they represent random samples of corresponding top-level Internet domains that account for a large portion of the Internet.
To find typosquatting domains within these samples, we first identified the typo domains in each. We used Google's typo correction service [13] to identify possible typos in domain names. This results in 38, 617 typo domains. However, such domains are not necessarily typosquatters: they might be benign domains that accidentally resemble typos of well-known domains. Typosquatters profit from traffic that accidentally comes to their domains. One common way of doing that is to host typosquatting domains from some parking domain service. 4 We identified the number of parked domains among these typo domains. To do so, we used the machinelearning-based classifier proposed in [33] . We discovered that 9, 830 out of 38, 617 are parked domains. We consider these 9, 830 names as the data set of typosquatting domains.
Armed with the typosquatting data set, we assess the level of HTTPS utilization. As shown in Table 1 , the result is that 486 domains use HTTPS. They represent our typosquatting SSL certificate corpus. For convenience, when we refer to typosquatting set, we mean the set of typosquatting domains that have SSL certificates.
Overlapping of Sets.
There is negligible overlapping among data sets. The size of the domain intersection between .com and Alexa is 81 (∼ 0.4% of .com) and the size of domain intersection between .net and Alexa is 17 (∼ 0.1% of .net). There is no overlapping between phishing and both .com and .net. The typosquatting set is a subset of the union of .com and .net sets, but it only represents a very small ratio (∼ 1% of the union of .com and .net sets). Surprisingly, there are four phishing domains that also belong to Alexa set, but the ratio of phishing domains in Alexa set is extremely small (∼ 0.01% of Alexa set). Thus, popular domains could (in very rare cases) host scam/phishing web sites.
Take Away. Based on the analysis of HTTPS usage in our data sets, we attempt to answer the second and third questions raised in Section 1: whether HTTPS will be widely adopted and whether web-fraudsters will adopt it as well. We believe that, since a significant percentage of popular and legitimate domains already use HTTPS, it is reasonable to assume that this number will increase, as advocated by the web security community. Moreover, we found that the same trend applies to phishing domains. Thus, fraudsters are being forced to contend with higher use HTTPS by adopting it themselves.
Analysis of SSL Certificates of Legitimate and Malicious Domains
We retrieved certificates of legitimate and malicious domains that use HTTPS and analyzed several fields and features derivable from SSL certificates. The goal is to guide the design of our detection method (classifier) presented later in the paper. One side-benefit of the analysis is that it reveals the differences between certificates used by fraudulent and legitimate/popular domains. In total, we identified 15 distinct certificate features reflected in Table 2 . 5 Most features map to actual certificate fields, e.g., F1 and F2. Others are computed from fields in the certificate but are not directly reflected in the fields, e.g., certificate validation failure (F5) or Jaccard distance between host name and common name in the subject field (F15). Note that some features match to boolean values, whereas, others are integers, reals or strings. Finally, we believe that most interesting results correspond to: F3 (self-signed), F4 (expired), F6 (common certificate) and F15 (host-common name distance).
Analysis of Certificate Boolean Features
Features F1-F8 have boolean values, e.g., F1 (md5) is true if the signature algorithm used in the certificate is "md5WithRSAEncryption". The analysis and distributions of these features (as shown in Table 3 ) are useful in revealing interesting and unexpected issues and differences between legitimate and malicious domains.
F1 (md5):
19% of Alexa certificates (24% and 22 % of .com and .net, respectively) use "md5WithRSAEncryption". This feature has a much higher ratio (35%) in phishing but only 26% in typosquatting. The higher ratio for phishing suggests a possible correlation between phishing domain certificates and "md5WithRSAEncryption" signature algorithm. It is interesting to witness that a high percentage of legitimate domains is still using "md5WithRSAEncryption" as the signature algorithm despite the well-known fact that rogue certificates can be constructed using MD5. Specifically, recent results [40] , [41] showed that MD5 can no longer be considered a secure cryptographic algorithm for use in digital signatures and certificates.
F2 (bogus subject): indicates whether the subject fields have some bogus values (e.g., "C=-", "ST=somestate", "O=someorganization", "CN=localhost", ...). We found that 11% of Alexa certificates (7% and 8% of .com and .net, respectively) satisfy this feature. Its percentage is much higher (20%) in phishing (29% in typosquatting). This might indicate that web-fraudsters fill subject values with bogus data or leave default values when generating certificates.
F3 (self-signed): indicates whether a certificate is self-signed. 28% of Alexa certificates are self-signed (24% and 27% of .com and .net, respectively). We did not expect to see such a high percentage among legitimate domains. An interesting open question is to investigate the reason(s) for all these certificates being self-signed; however, this is out of the scope of our present work. The percentages of self-signed certificates in phishing and typosquatting are 36% and 53%, respectively. This is expected, since miscreants running such domains avoid leaving a trail by obtaining a certificate from a CA, which requires some documentation and payment. Despite high ratios in legitimate sets, there is a significant variance between the ratios in the legitimate sets and phishing (8-12%). This variance is even larger between legitimate sets and typosquatting (25-29%).
F4 (expired):
another alarming result is the fraction of expired certificates: 21% of Alexa (25% and 22% of .com and .net) as well as 26% and 43% of phishing and typosquatting, respectively. Such high percentages of expired certificates are less surprising for phishing and typosquatting than for legitimate domains. There is a non-negligible difference in the ratios between phishing and Alexa (5%). We note that the percentage for typosquatting is the highest.
F5 (verification failed):
certificates satisfying F5 should be a superset of those satisfying F3 or F4. (If a certificate is self-signed or expired then it will fail validation by any web browser). We uses OpenSSL 0.9.8k [14] to validate certificates and found that 29% of Alexa certificates (40% and 37% of .com and .net) fail verification. Also, 36% and 70% of phishing and typosquatting certificates fail verification. This illustrates a remarkable difference in percentages phishing and Alexa: the percentages in .com and .net sets are higher than in phishing. This might be due to the fact that domains in .com and .net sets are random domains and mostly unpopular (the intersections with Alexa's top 100k domains are negligible). Thus, having a valid certificate (or being accessible via HTTPS) is not essential to these domains. Also, as above, the highest percentage is in typosquatting.
F6 (common certificate) and F7 (common serial number): F6 indicates whether the certificate is also used for multiple domains in our data sets. 33% of certificates in Alexa are duplicated (60% and 64% of .com and .net, respectively). The percentage goes up to 72% for phishing and 95% for typosquatting. F7 indicates whether a certificate serial number is used in another certificate in our data sets. 38% of Alexa certificates have common serial numbers (33% were entirely duplicated). Also, 64% and 68% of .com and .net as well as 75% and 96% in phishing and typosquatting satisfy F7.
Certificates in phishing and typosquatting have higher duplication ratios than legitimate data sets (especially Alexa) suggesting that F7, perhaps combined with other features, could be helpful in identifying phishing and typosquatting domains.
F8 (validity period > 3 years): it seems intuitive that malicious domains would not acquire certificates valid for long periods of time. Thus, we obtain percentages of certificates with validity periods exceeding 3 years. Alexa has 17% (14% and 17% of .com and .net, respectively), while phishing has 13% and typosquatting -19%. We present further details on the exact duration of validity periods in the analysis of non-boolean features in Section 3.2.2. As expected, the percentage of phishing certificates satisfying F8 is smaller than that for Alexa. Whereas, percentages for typosquatting and Alexa are close. 
Analysis of Certificate Non Boolean Features
Recall that F9-F12 have string values. F9-F11 are related to the certificate issuer: common name, organization name and country. F12 is the certificate subject's country.
F9 (issuer common name) and F10 (issuer organization): 6 Figures 2(a) and 2(b)
show the distributions of the common-name field in Alexa and phishing, respectively. Comparing the two figures we see a difference in distributions. In particular, some of the common-names are popular in phishing but not in Alexa. For example, "Equifax" is the most popular CommonName for phishing (16%), whereas it is only 6% in Alexa. (The same holds for the common-name "UTN"). Also, the percentage of certificates without common names ("JustNone") is larger in Alexa (16%) than in phishing (4%). We make similar observations for organization name. For example, "Verisign" represents 10% of Alexa and 2.5% in phishing. Also, "SomeOrganization" accounts for 11% in phishing and 7% in Alexa. Although such observations alone are not enough to discriminate phishing from popular/legitimate domains, they can be combined with others for more effective discrimination. It is also interesting to see that a non-trivial percentage of phishing domains still obtain certificates from legitimate CAs.
F11 and F12 (issuer and subject countries): Analysis of countries of issuers and subjects revealed that USA (US) and South Africa (ZA) are responsible for around 50% and 20% (respectively) for both legitimate/popular and malicious domains. All other countries account only for 30%. This is expected since several major CAs are located US and ZA. Also, the granularity of countries is too coarse to derive useful information and the field can be easily filled with bogus values. Figure 3 (a) compares the validity period CDF for phishing and legitimate sets. It shows similarities among the distributions: in Alexa, 32% are valid for 365 days and 10% for 730, as opposed to 32% for 365 days and 17% for 731 in phishing. phishing has a gradual increase in validity periods over 731, whereas Alexa has a small jump around 1, 095 (3%). The longest validity period is 4, 096 days in phishing and 2, 918, 805 in Alexa. Figure 3(b) compares the validity period CDF of typosquatting set with that of legitimate sets. The figure clearly shows that typosquatting certificates are valid for smaller number of days than those in legitimate sets. This difference in distributions is larger than that between phishing and legitimate sets.
F13 (exact validity duration, in days):
F14 (serial number length): we assume that a genuine SSL certificate issued by a reputable CA would likely contain a long serial number, which assures uniqueness. We plot the CDF for serial number length for all data sets in Figure 4 (a). It suggests that phishing certificates tend to have shorter serial number length than legitimate certificates, especially, those in Alexa. Around 40% in Alexa have a serial number of length 39 (18.5% of 13, 11% of 15, 11%, 10% of 9, 10% of 23 and 6% of 11). The distribution is different for phishing, where 29% have length of 39 (22% of 13, 16% of 9, 11% of 23, 10% of 11 and 7% of 15). Figure 4 (b) shows that typosquatting certificates tend to have shorter serial number than certificates in legitimate sets. Also, the difference between typosquatting and legitimate sets distributions is larger than that between phishing and legitimate sets.
F15 (host-common name distance): in valid certificates, we expect common name in the subject field to be very similar to hostname. We intuitively expect that the difference between common name and hostname in malicious domain certificates is greater than that in legitimate certificates, since malicious domains may not use complying SSL certificates. This feature captures the Jaccard Distance [28] between hostname and common-name.
The Jaccard Distance measures the closeness between two strings (A and B) and is defined as J(A,B) = (A and B)/(A or B). J(A,B) is basically the size of the intersection between set A and B divided by the size of their union. Thus, the larger the Jaccard distance between two strings, the more similar they are. Figure 5 (a) compares the Jaccard distance CDF of phishing and other legitimate sets. As expected, phishing certificates tend to have smaller Jaccard distance than those in Alexa. 30% in Alexa have a Jaccard Distance of 0 (5% of 1, 4% of 0.7 and several 3-4% jumps from 0.6 until 0.9). This distribution looks very different for phishing, since 43% have a Jaccard Distance of 0 (4% a distance of 1 and the main jumps exist between 0 and 0.5 as opposed to 0.6 to 0.9 in Alexa). The distribution of .com (.net) shows a trend different from Alexa. From the figure, we observe that .com (.net) certificates have smaller Jaccard Distance than phishing. For example, 90% (93%) of certificates in .com (.net) have Jaccard distance ≤ 0.2. Whereas, 71% in phishing have a Jaccard distance of ≤ 0.2. This might be due to the fact that domains in .com and .net sets are random domains and mostly unpopular (the intersections with Alexa's top 100k domains are negligible). Thus, having a complying SSL certificate is not essential to these domains. Figure 5(b) compares the Jaccard distance CDF of typosquatting with legitimate sets.
It clearly shows that typosquatting certificates tend to have smaller Jaccard distance. This is expected since typosquatters may use non-complying SSL certificates.
Summary of Certificate Feature Analysis:
We summarize the most important observations from our analysis:
1. For many features, distributions of malicious sets are significantly different from those of legitimate sets.
2. Around 20% of legitimate popular domains in Alexa are still using the signature algorithm "md5WithRSAEncryption" despite its clear insecurity.
3. A significant percentage (> 30%) of legitimate domain certificates are expired and/or selfsigned. Several user studies (e.g. [43] and [25] ) show that an overwhelming percentage (up to 70-80% in some cases) of users ignore browser warning messages. This may explain the unexpected high percentages of expired and self-signed certificates that we find in the results of all our data sets. Users simply ignore those warnings and this gives no incentive for organizations to update and pay attention to their certificates.
4. Duplicate certificate percentages are very high in phishing domains, which points to the possibility that phishers use certificates only to display the familiar lock icon in the browser, hoping that users will not pay attention.
5. For some features, the difference in distributions between malicious and legitimate sets is small. However, these features turn out to be useful in building a classifier (see Section 4).
For most features, the difference in distributions between
Alexa and malicious sets is larger than that between .com/.net and malicious sets.
These observations are useful for determining the features to include in the classifier described next, in Section 4. We acknowledge that more analysis is needed to track the evolution of features over time.
Certificate-based Classifier
The analysis in Section 3.2 described several features that show distributions in legitimate data sets (Alexa, .com and .net) that are significantly different from those in malicious sets (phishing and typosquatting). Even though some show marked differences, relying on a single feature to identify malicious domains can yield a high rate of false positives. Thus, combining all promising features is the natural path. One way to do so, is to simply use a set of heuristics. For example, if F1-F8 are all true, the given domain is malicious with overwhelming probability. However, this might necessitate performing an exhaustive search over many combinations of heuristics, in order to find the optimal one. Another way is to take advantage of machine-learning algorithms and let them find the best combination of features. Machine learning algorithms are well suited for classification problems.
We sample several machine-learning-based classification algorithms and select the best performer. Specifically, we consider the following algorithms: Random Forest [22] , Support Vector Machines [23, 29] , Decision Tree [37] , Decision Table [31] , Nearest Neighbor [35] and Neural Networks [35] . In addition, we explore two optimization techniques for Decision Trees: Bagging [21, 38] and Boosting [27, 38] . Algorithm descriptions are out of the scope; we refer to [22, 23, 29, 37, 31, 35, 35, 21, 38, 27, 38] for relevant background information.
We use precision-recall performance metrics to summarize the performance of a classifier. These metrics consists of the following ratios: Positive Recall, Positive Precision, Negative Recall, and Negative Precision. We use the term "Positive" set to denote malicious domains (phishing or typosquatting) and "Negative" set to refer to legitimate domains. The positive (negative) recall value is the fraction of positive (negative) domains that are correctly identified by the classifier. Positive (negative) precision is the actual fraction of positive (negative) domains in the set identified by the classifier. Note that we can derive the false positive ratio from the positive precision ratio (False Positive Ratio = 1 -Positive Precision). Also, we can derive the false negative ratio from the negative precision ratio (False Negative Ratio = 1 -Negative Precision).
We evaluate the performance of the classifier using the ten-fold cross validation method [35] . In it, we randomly divide the data set into 10 sets of equal size, perform 10 different training/testing steps where each step consists of training a classifier on 9 sets and then testing it on the remaining one set. We take the average of all results as the final performance result of the classifier.
We use most of features discussed in Section 3.2 to build two binary classifiers: (1) a Phishing Classifier and (2) a Typosquatting Classifier. The phishing/typosquatting classifier distinguishes non-phishing/non-typosquatting domains from phishing/typosquatting domains using only information from SSL certificates. These classifiers are described next.
Phishing Classifier
This classifier uses the following features: (F1) md5, (F2) bogus subject, (F3) self-signed, (F4) expired, (F6) common certificate, (F7) common serial number, (F8) validity period (F9) issuer common name, (F10) issuer organization name, (F11) issuer country, (F12) subject country, (F14) serial number length and (F15) host-common name distance.
For the four string-valued features (F9-F12), we do not use their actual string values. Instead, we use a set of boolean features that correspond to most of values these features assume. For example, issuer-country string-value feature is transformed into a set of boolean features, such as "issuer-country-is-USA" and "issuer-country-is-UK", that are set to True/False depending on the issuer-country string value (e.g., "issuer-country-is-USA" is True if issuer-country = "US"). Note that we limit the number of boolean features. As a result, we have 14 boolean subfeatures for both issuer-common-name and issuer-organization-name and 9 boolean sub-features for issuer-country and subject-country. This adds up to a total of 55 features.
We create two training data sets for two different purposes. The first consists of 840 SSL certificates half of which are for phishing (positive set) and the other half -for legitimate (negative set) domains. Legitimate certificates are for the 220 top Alexa's domains, 105 random .com domains and 105 random .net domains. That is, half of legitimate certificates are for popular domains and the other half are for legitimate random domains. The purpose of training on this data set is to create a classifier that differentiates, based on SSL certificates, between phishing and non-phishing domains. Table 4 shows performance metric values for different classifiers. The Bagging classifier shows the highest phishing detection accuracy. Despite the limited number of fields in the certificates and the dependencies among them, we can build a classifier with 80% phishing detection accuracy (or 20% false positive rate).
The second training data set consists of 840 SSL certificates. Half of these are for phishing domains (positive set) and the rest -legitimate certificates for 420 top Alexa's domains (negative Positive Table 5 . They improve markedly from those in the first training data set. Random Forest (along with few others) exhibits the best phishing detection accuracy with a rate of 89% (11% false positive rate). The reason is that (as shown in Section 3.2) the difference in distributions of many features between Alexa and phishing sets is much larger than that between .com (.net) and the phishing sets. Thus, the random .com and .net certificates are polluting the non-phishing set and making it harder to differentiate. Although the number of certificate fields is small, we can reliably differentiate phishing from popular domains with high accuracy. Similar to machine-learning-based spam filtering solutions, the larger the training data set, the better the performance is. We believe that our solution may incur false positives when actually deployed. However, the number of false positives can be reduced by training on larger data sets and newer samples. We note that the use of the classifier alone cannot successfully detect all phishing web sites, since it only works with HTTPS. However, our approach can be combined with other phishing mitigation techniques (e.g., [48, 30, 26] ) to enhance the overall accuracy. Our results show how clearly limited information pulled from SSL certificates (which has been overlooked before) can help in distinguishing phishing and legitimate domains.
Typosquatting Classifier
We also developed a typosquatting classifier. Its features are selected in the same way as those of the phishing classifier. Here, we also create two training data sets: the first with certificates of 486 domains from the typosquatting (positive) data set (see Section 3.1) and 486 non-typosquatting (negative) domains. Half of the negatives are picked randomly from Alexa and the rest are random .com and .net domains (distributed equally between the two). This training set needs to train the classifier to differentiate between typosquatting and nontyposquatting domains. Performance of various classifiers is shown in Table 6 . The metrics are fairly similar across classifiers, however, Decision Tree offers the highest accuracy with a rate of 93% (7% false positive rate). The second data set consists of the same typosquatting certificates in the previous data set and certificates of 486 Alexa top domains. This set is needed to train the classifier to differentiate, typosquatting and popular domains. Performance results are shown in Table 7 . The performance of many classifiers has improved. This is because the difference in distributions of features between Alexa and typosquatting data sets is larger than the difference between .com (.net) and typosquatting data sets. Neural Network classifier shows the highest typosquatting detection accuracy, with a rate of 95%(5% false positive rate).
Discussion
We acknowledge that our measurements should be extended with longer observation periods and larger data sets, we believe that this work provides encouraging evidence. First, we find that a significant percentage of well-known domains already use HTTPS (alongside HTTP) which means that one can use their legitimate certificates without any modifications from their side. We believe that this trend (adopting HTTPS) will continue growing. Furthermore, the non-trivial portion of phishing web sites using HTTPS highlights the need to analyze and correlate the information provided in their server certificates.
Using information in certificates. Our results show significant differences between certificates of legitimate domains and those of phishing and typosquatting domains. Not only is this information alone sufficient to detect fraudulent activities as we have shown, but it is also a useful component in assessing a web site's degree of trustworthiness, thus improving prior metrics, such as [48, 30, 26] . Our method should be integrated with other techniques to improve the effectiveness of detecting malicious domains. We remark that our study not only provides a measurement study of the usage of HTTPS (along with the details of the certificates used in popular, legitimate and malicious domains), but it also proposes a classifier that detects phishing and typosquatting domains with high accuracy, based on our measurements and analysis.
Limitations. Despite showing promising results, we acknowledge that our study has several limitations. Domains in our data sets need to be probed over longer periods. Furthermore, additional data sets of legitimate domains need to be taken into consideration, e.g. popular web sites in different countries. Data sets of typosquatting domains can be strengthened by additional and more effective name variations. We plan to consider these issues in our future work. Also, we acknowledge that our phishing(typosquatting) classifier may incur false positives when actually deployed. However, this is a common problem to many machine-learning-based mitigation solutions (spam filtering and intrusion detections based on machine-learning algorithms) and the number of false positives can be minimized by training the classifier on larger and more comprehensive data sets (and continuing to do so for new samples). We believe that our classifier would not provide a complete solution to the phishing(typosquatting) threat since many domains do not have HTTPS. However, our solution can be integrated with the current solutions (e.g., [48, 30, 26] ) and improve the overall effectiveness. Finally, we note that our classifier does not identify all kinds of typosquatting domains. For instance, typo-domains displaying unexpected pages and ads might have no incentive to use HTTPS, since they do not attempt to elicit private information from users. However, an increasing enforcement of HTTPS would force typosquatters to utilize SSL certificates. Generic typosquatting detection remains an interesting open issue that has not found effective solutions so far.
Keeping state of encountered certificates. We deliberately choose to conduct our measurements as general as possible, without relying on user navigation history or on user specific training data. These components are fundamental for most current mitigation techniques [26, 36] . Moreover, we believe that keeping track of navigation history is detrimental to user privacy. However, our work yields effective detection by analyzing certain coarse-grained information extracted from server certificates and not specific to a user's navigation patterns. This is not privacy compromising as keeping fine-grained navigation history.
How malicious domains will adapt. Web-fraudsters are diligent and quickly adapt to new security mechanisms and studies that threat their business. There is an arms race between the security community at large and the organizations and individuals behind domains that host web-fraud activities. If web-browsers use our classifier and start analyzing SSL certificate fields in more detail, we expect there will be two scenarios for web-fraudsters to adapt: (1) to get legitimate certificates from CAs and leave a paper trail pointing to "some person or organization" which is connected to such activity, (2) to craft certificates that have similar values like those that are the most common in those of legitimate domains. Some fields/features will be easy to forge with legitimate values (e.g., country of issuer, country of subject, subject common and organization name, validity period, signature algorithm, serial number ...etc) but for some this will not be possible (issuer name, signature ...etc) because otherwise the verification of the certificate will fail. In either case the effectiveness of web-fraud will be reduced.
Related Work
The importance and danger of web-fraud (such as phishing and typosquatting) has been recognized in numerous prior publications, studies and industry reports. One of the main incentives (besides the problem remaining largely unsolved) has to do with tremendous financial losses [5] .
One notable study is [19] which analyzes the infrastructure for hosting and supporting Internet scams, including phishing. It uses an opportunistic measurement technique called "spamscatter" that mines email messages in real-time, follows the embedded link structure, and automatically clusters destination web sites using image shingling. The study was performed on a large real-time spam feed (over 1M messages per week) and identified 2, 000 distinct scam types hosted across 7, 000 distinct servers.
In [26] , machine learning based methodology is proposed for detecting phishing email. This technique, which like ours is based on a classifier, detects phishing with 96% accuracy and false negative rate of only 0.1%. An anti-phishing browser extension (AntiPhish) is given in [30] . It keeps track of sensitive information and warns the user whenever the user tries to enter sensitive information into untrusted web sites. Our classifier can be easily integrated with AntiPhish. However, AntiPhish compromises user privacy by keeping state of sensitive data. [36] proposes an anti-phishing solution that does not rely on users during the authentication process, since users might not pay attention and reveal sensitive information to untrusted sites. Instead, it uses a trusted mobile device in the authentication protocol. Thus, to succeed, the attacker must obtain the user's password and have access to the trusted device.
User studies analyzing the effectiveness of browser warning messages indicate that an overwhelming percentage (up to 70-80% in some cases) of users ignore them. This observation, which is confirmed in recent research results (e.g., [43] and [25] ), explains the unexpected high percentage of expired and self signed certificates that we find in the results of all our data sets. Users simply ignore those warnings and this gives no incentive for organizations to update and pay attention to their certificates.
In [47] , the authors propose a solution to simplify the process (for the users) of authenticating the servers' public keys (or SSL certificates) by deploying a set of semi-trusted collection of network servers that continuously probe the servers and collect their public keys (or SSL certificates). When the user is exposed to a new public key (SSL certificate), he refers to these semi-trusted servers to verify the authenticity of public keys (SSL certificates).
In [34] , the authors tackle the problem of detecting malicious web sites by only analyzing their URLs. In particular, they use machine-learning statistical techniques to classify web sites based on the lexical and host-based features of their URLs. They evaluate their solution on 20,000 to 30,000 URLS obtained from different sources. Their solution achieves a prediction accuracy of 95-99%.
There are also are some studies that measure the extent of typosquatting and suggest mitigation techniques. Wang, et al. [45] showed that many typosquatting domains are active and parked with a few parking services, which serve ads on them. To this end, a tool called "Strider URL Tracer" was proposed: it displays third-party URLs on a web site and helps trademark owners check for typosquatters by automatically generating and scanning typo-domains. However, this tool requires manual intervention to verify that a domain is indeed "typosquatting". Similarly, [20] measures the extent of typosquatting by generating around 3 million URL variations from 900 well-known domains and probing them for typosquatting. Results show that, for nearly 57% of original URLs, over 35% of all possible URL variations exist on the Internet. Surprisingly, over 99% of such similarly-named web sites were considered phony. McAfee also studied the typosquatting problem in [39] . A set of 1.9 million single-error typos was generated and 127, 381 suspected typosquatting domains were discovered. Alarmingly, the study also found that typosquatters target children-oriented domains. Finally, McAfee added to its extension site advisor [9] some capabilities for identifying typosquatters.
[33] devised a methodology for identifying ads-portals and parked domains. It studied the prevalence of parked domains and typosquatting on the Internet by analyzing .com and .net Internet Zone files [16] . This study found that around 25% of (two-level) .com and .net domains are ads-portals and around 40% of those are typosquatting.
In summary, to the best of our knowledge, no prior work has explored the web-fraud problem in the context of HTTPS and proposed analyzing server-side SSL certificates in more detail. Our work yields a detailed analysis of SSL certificates from different domain types and a classifier that detects web-fraud domains based on their certificates. We acknowledge (and our results confirm this) that many typosquatting sites do not use HTTPS. However, about 5% do use HTTPS and we expect this percentage to increase in the future, especially, for typo-domains used as platforms for phishing. The situation is different for phishing domains: our findings show that around 30% already utilize HTTPS. Our classifier is orthogonal to other existing solutions. Therefore, our approach should be regarded as a part of a larger mitigation system.
